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In their chapter, Trabandt and Uhlig compute La⁄er curves for for the United
States and fourteen European countries. Their goal is to assess the limits of
taxation in these countries and its implications for government de￿cit and the
sustainability of current debt levels. Overall, I think this is a very interesting
research project and a most welcome contribution to the current debate on ￿scal
policy in Europe and elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the estimates provided by the
authors are subject to a number of important critiques, some of which I detail
below. Despite this, we desperately need quantitative estimates of the e⁄ects of
￿scal policy and the methodology developed by the authors can help us obtain
those.
In this short comment, I ￿rst review the author￿ s methodology and highlight
on the way its basic strengths and weaknesses. This takes most of the space of
these comments. After doing this, I brie￿ y describe the main results and add
some general remarks on them.
The methodology used by the authors can be summarized in ￿ve steps or
assumptions. I describe next these steps or assumptions using a simpli￿ed ver-
sion of the model that does not take into account monopolistic competition or
human capital accumulation. These extensions are important from a quantita-
tive perspective, but are not central when it comes to explain and comment on
Trabandt and Uhlig￿ s methodology.
The ￿rst step is to assume that aggregate production in the US and the four-
teen European countries can be well described by a Cobb-Douglas technology














where I use the same notation as the authors. In particular, yt is output; kt
and nt are the stocks of capital and labor; ￿
t denotes the trend in total factor
productivity; and ￿ is a parameter such that ￿ 2 (0;1). This is routinely as-
sumed in macroeconomics. But still I cannot resist mentioning here again that
this might be a poor assumption when one goes beyond building theoretical
examples and tries instead to use the models to make quantitative assessments.
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1In open economies, international trade a⁄ects the aggregate production func-
tion. Comparative advantage and increasing returns lead countries to specialize
their production in di⁄erent sets of industries. Even if all the countries in the
sample had the same industry production functions, their aggregate production
functions might di⁄er substantially as the latter also depend on these countries￿
industry mix.1 This might be important for the calculations. As taxes are
changed, patterns of specialization are altered and so does the shape of the pro-
duction function. It is hard to assess here the biases that this misspeci￿cation
of the model induces in the results, though. But it certainly induces additional
uncertainty regarding the estimates.
The second step is to assume that factors markets are competitive and, as a
result, factors are paid their marginal product:2

















t ￿ ￿ ￿ kt =
￿













where wt is the wage and rt ￿ ￿ is the rental minus the depreciation rate. This
assumption is also standard in quantitative, but widely acknowledged to be
unrealistic. Collective bargaining, regulations of various sorts and many other
frictions ensure that labor markets in many European countries are anything but
competitive. Adverse selection, agency costs, oligopolistic behavior by banks
and other frictions create a wedge between the rates of return to investment
and those that are perceived by savers. This might also be important for the
calculations. As taxes are changed, factor rewards might change more or less
than proportionally, depending on the nature of these frictions. Once again, it
is hard to assess the biases that this misspeci￿cation of the model induces in the
results, though. This depends on the speci￿c frictions that are more prevalent
in labor markets, but a good dose of healthy skepticism should be used after
assuming that the United States and Spain have the same competitive labor
and ￿nancial markets.
The ￿rst couple of steps allow us to write tax revenues are as follows:







￿ kt = ￿k ￿
￿


































1See Ventura (1995) for a detailed discussion of this point, and Fadinger (2011) for an
attempt to quantify its importance when estimating cross-country productivity di⁄erences.
2With monopolistic competition, the wage becomes lower than the marginal product of
labor, but it is still proportional to it.
2where ￿k, ￿n and ￿c are the applicable tax rates on capital income, labor in-
come and consumption respectively; while Tk, Tn and Tc are the respective tax
collections. Computing La⁄er curves consists of plotting tax revenues as the
applicable tax rates increase. To be able to do this, we need a theory of the
capital-income ratio, employment and the propensity to consume out of income







to changes in ￿k, ￿n and ￿c. And this is what the next couple of steps provide.
Before doing this, it is useful to highlight a very positive feature of this
methodology in that it recognizes that sometimes, the main e⁄ects on tax rev-
enues of a change in a given tax work through other taxes! For instance, an
increase in capital income taxes might have a larger negative e⁄ect on labor tax
revenues than on capital income taxes. By studying all these taxes together,
this methodology allows us to consider these general equilibrium e⁄ects.
The third step in Trabandt and Uhlig￿ s methodology is to assume that the
behavior of savings and employment are well approximated by the steady state
of an in￿nite-horizon neoclassical growth model. In such a model, the ￿rst-order




































where ￿ is the rate of time preference and ’ is the constant Frisch elasticity of
the labor supply. These equations are standard, and equate the growth in the
marginal utility of consumption with the interest rate and the marginal utility
of consumption times the wage with the disutility of labor. As it is typical in
macroeconomics, the authors use a description of aggregate choice that abstracts
from demographic structure. Surely changes in taxes have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the
young and the old, and therefore demographic structure might be an important
factor. Moreover, this demographic structure might be quite di⁄erent across
countries.
The fourth step consists of assuming that the government adjusts transfers





















This step is highlights another positive feature of this methodology, in that it
forces us to make assumptions on what the government does (or stops doing)
when tax revenues change. An assumption of this sort is needed, since the
impact of a reduction of tax rates depends crucially on what the government
does with the additional revenue. But I wonder whether it would have been
more realistic to assume that tax revenues are used to reduce debt levels. This
3would certainly complicate some of the technical details of the calibration. But
it might be quite di⁄erent to assume that the government pays creditors rather
than transfers back the taxes to the those that have been taxed. If, as it is the
case in many countries, creditors are foreigners debt reduction has a negative
wealth e⁄ect that is not taken care in the current set of results. This negative
wealth e⁄ect is likely to reduce tax collections substantially.
Despite these caveats, the methodology is clear and sound. We can now






as a function of ￿k, ￿n and
￿c; and then plug the results into Equations (4), (5) and (6). Once this is done,
we cna compute La⁄er curves. For instance, the capital-tax La⁄er curve for ￿k
traces how total revenue T ￿ Tk +Tn+Tc changes with ￿k keeping other taxes
constant. Analogous procedures yield the labor-tax and consumption-tax La⁄er
curves. Also, it is possible to construct La⁄er hills by combining two taxes. Only
one thing is missing to be able to perform this quantitative exercise, and this is
to choose parameter values.
The ￿fth and ￿nal step of this methodology is to choose these values. Here
Trabandt and Uhlig assume that all countries have the same parameter values,
except for their ￿scal policy variables, i.e. tax rates, government spending and
public debt. Then, they choose parameter values in the usual RBC style. This is
perhaps where there is more room to make improvements at a low cost. Surely
one can choose parameter values di⁄erently for each country, drawing from the
large literature on quantitative macroeconomic models that has been developed
in the last couple of decades.
The methodology described above (with some re￿nements that include mo-
nopolistic competition and human capital accumulation) generates an interest-
ing result: Assume all changes in revenue went into paying interest on the debt,
what is the highest interest that countries could pay? If only labor taxes are
used, the US could a⁄ord real interest rates rates between 12 and 15 percent;
Ireland could a⁄ord rates of 11 percent; Germany, Portugal and Spain close of
around 9 percent; while Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finaland, France, Greece
and Italy cannot a⁄ord interst rates above 6 percent. These interest rates grow
a bit when capital income taxes can be used, but not too much. On the one
hand, these are the kind of quantitative results that we need to produce as
a profession. On the other hand, the crudeness of the assumptions discussed
above makes us wonder about how seriously we should take these numbers. To
what extent is the model reliable and/or stable across countries? To what ex-
tent frictions in labor and ￿nancial markets a⁄ect the reaction of the tax base
to changes in taxes? To what extent are the assumptions of a stable ￿scal
policy without sovereign defaults, for instance, a reasonable characterization of
the current situation? To what extent is the long-run analysis performed here
a good guide for policy in the current depression? It would be unfair to ask
Trabandt and Uhlig to answer all these questions in a single piece of research.
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